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This article seeks to introduce an autoethnography as a method 
in studying Islamic law. Through an autoethnography, a scholar 
could share a uni que and subjective experience, which would 
not only contribute to the understanding of social phenomenon 
but also reflect on possible different situations upon knowing the 
reality. It not only makes a sequence of events and their 
interpretation, but it also asks readers to emotionally ‘relive’ the 
events with the writer of autoethnography. This article uncovers 
processes and dynamics of my own thought in approaching and 
comprehending law in Islam including topics such as usul fiqh 
and legal pluralism. It discloses the development of my research 
interest and scope, both nationally and internationally in the 
past three decades. The article argues that knowledge is not 
necessarily produced by research work. In fact, personal 
narratives are considered scientific in that they could contribute 
knowledge to what we know about the world in which we live. 
And, last but not least, personal stories are valuable if they 
could: 1) provide a legitimate claim or justification, 2) offer 
something new to learn, and 3) help other people cope with or 
better understand world issues. 
 




As a method, autoethnography is used in various social 
disciplines including anthropology, sociology, history, 
literature, education, communication, and psychology. 
Autoethnography is a term in the qualitative study which has 
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nature.1 However, a large group of scholars have argued that 
the personal nature or self element in a scientific paper should 
be minimized or made even zero. It has been pondered that 
self-narratives entail subjective bias and diminish the 
scholarship value of a paper.  
Despite this premise, Sarah Wall, one of the most leading 
ethnographers contended that self-exploration in a paper has 
now become a common practice. In fact, when seen from the 
postmodernism point of view, such criticisms of the 
autoethnographic approach are no longer relevant.2 With the 
presence of postmodernism paradigm, each of different ways of 
knowing and inquiring becomes equally legitimate. This is 
because the main objective of postmodernism is not to 
eliminate the existing scientific approaches; rather it sought to 
criticize their dominance and at the same time proposed some 
key alternative approaches, including autoethnography. 
Through an autoethnography, a writer could share his unique 
and subjective experience, which would not only contribute to 
the understanding of social phenomenon but also reflect on 
possible different situations upon knowing the reality.3   
This article is an autoethnographic thinking which serves 
as both self-reflection and personal narration. It seeks to 
explore self-experience (auto) and systematically interpret and 
reflect it (graphy) in order to understand the sociocultural 
aspects surrounding it (ethno).4 By unfolding my personal 
 
1 David Hayano, “Auto-Ethnography: Paradigms, Problems, and 
Prospects”. Human Organization 38 (1): Spring 1979, pp. 99-104.  
2 Sarah Wall, “An Autoethnography on Learning about 
Autoethnography”, International Journal of Qualitative Methods 5 (2), 
June 2006, p. 2. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Carolyn Ellis, The ethnographic I: A methodological novel about 
autoethnography. Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press, 2004); Garance 
Maréchal, Autoethnography. In Albert J. Mills, Gabrielle Durepos & 
Elden Wiebe (Eds.), Encyclopedia of case study research (Vol. 2, pp. 
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stories related to experiences and sociocultural life, what I am 
trying to do here is not only to make a sequence of events and 
their interpretation, but also to ask readers of this article to, as 
Richardson puts it, “emotionally ‘relive’ the events with the 
writer.”5  
My aim in this article is to uncover processes and 
dynamics of my own thought in approaching and 
comprehending law in Islam since I began my undergraduate 
study in 1989 at the Department of Comparative Law and 
Islamic Schools (Perbandingan Mazhab dan Hukum or PMH) of 
Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN) Jakarta up to 
my current position as a Professor of Islamic Law at the same 
university. More importantly, this article discloses the 
development of my research interest and scope, both nationally 
and internationally in the past three decades. I will discuss 
some legal and social concepts to explain how my thought on 
law in Islam was shaped, reshaped, and influenced by various 
textbooks, journal articles, monographs that I read, and more 
importantly by scholars and experts that I met along my 
academic and research journeys.  
B. Ciputat School of Thought 
I would like to begin this personal narrative by revisiting 
my studentship in the early 1990s when I was registered as a 
bachelor degree student at the Faculty of Sharia, IAIN Jakarta. 
Along with my peers, seniors, and juniors, we founded a study 
club called Forum Studi Hukum Islam (FSHI).6 During the 1980s 
to 1990s, study clubs on different disciplines and areas with a 
range of perspectives were mushrooming in Ciputat, a 
suburban area in the south of Jakarta. The well-known study 
clubs in Ciputat among others were Formaci, Respondeo, 
Flamboyan Shelter, and Piramida. Each club has its own focus 
 
5 Laurel Richardson, “New Writing practices in qualitative research, 
Sociology of Sport Journal 17 (2000), p. 11. 
6 FSHI stands for Study forum of Islamic Law. The members of what 
used to be FSHI are now lecturers at the Faculty of Sharia and Law of 
UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, such as: Prof. Nadirsyah Hosen, 
Prof. Euis Amalia, Dr. Yayan Sofyan, Afwan Faizin, MA., Azharudin 
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and strength such as: social theory, religious studies, political 
science, philosophy, and theology. The FSHI itself focused on 
legal theories, legal philosophy, and usul fiqh. Regular and 
periodical discussions were conducted to address concepts, 
theories, paradigms, thoughts of prominent Muslim experts, 
and historical legal practices as well as legal issues in 
contemporary contexts.  
One of the major themes intensively discussed at FSHI 
meetings was a reform in Islamic legal thought. The word 
‘reform served as an appealing key concept, major icon, and 
trend among the Ciputat student activists at that time. This 
was magnified by active participation and contribution of IAIN 
important figures such as Harun Nasution, Nurcholish Madjid, 
Munawir Sjadzali, Ibrahim Hosen and others who were 
widelyknown as the key advocates of reform in Islam and its 
social aspects. Issues and cases of reform they had proposed 
and promoted were often provocative and controversial. Despite 
all these dynamics, IAIN (prior to its renaming into UIN) had 
managed to affirm its identity as a reformist Islamic higher 
education institution thus being established as one of the elite 
universities in the socio-religious thoughts. 
In this context of intellectual dynamics, the discussion of 
Islamic legal thoughts among the FSHI members tended to 
"rebel" the comfort shackles of classical theories and outdated 
legal concepts. Since then, the alternative discussion on usul 
fiqh became the most popular topic of discussion in every 
meeting. One of the most cited books referring to the 
contemporary paradigm of usul fiqh was Al-Shatibi’s book 
entitled Al-Muwafaqat7. This book which rooted from Maliki 
mazhab presents a discussion of two main concepts, namely 
'maqasid al-shariah' and the 'maslahat'. Both concepts 
presented in the book had been discussed frequently in FSHI 
forum by inviting some external speakers. The study on these 
two concepts was a favorite as it was seen coherent to the non-
literal thinking or to be exact, substantialism. These two 
concepts had colored the debates of FSHI meetings, 
 
7 Abu Ishaq Ibrahim Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat fî Usûl al-
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particularly when related to the current Islamic law in 
Indonesia.  
In my final year of undergraduate study, the head of the 
Department of Comparative Law and Islamic Schools, Prof. Dr. 
Huzaemah Tahido approved my thesis proposal entitled  
“Transformasi `illah sebagai metode reinterpretasi hukum 
Islam8”. This thesis departed from a fiqh principle al-hukmu 
yaduru ma`a `illatihi wujudan aw `adaman (a legal clause may 
alter depending upon the existed or negated `illat or reasoning). 
Under the supervision of the late Prof. Dr. Satria Effendi 
(Allahu yarham), I constructed my thesis by proposing an 
argument that for the purpose of Islamic legal reform in 
contemporary era, `illat as legal reasoning does not necessarily 
need to be tangible. I contended that `illat may transform into 
maslahat. Therefore, maslahat could function as a legal `illat 
which justifies the legal reform. On December 30, 1993 in my 
thesis defense, my examiner Prof. Dr. Hasanuddin AF rebutted 
my argument by contending that there is a significant 
difference between `illat and maslahat concepts. `illat tends to 
be more visible and subtle, while maslahat tends to be relative 
to the person, time, and place. Therefore, maslahat is not 
reliable to be measured and cannot function as `illat. As a 
student of the Department of Comparative Law and Islamic 
Schools (PMH) whose principle was “we are different in opinion 
because we are PMH”, the examiner rebuttal became a 
constructive input to support my intellectual maturity.9 
Upon my graduation in February 1994, I continued my 
study at the Graduate Program IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah that 
was directed by the late Prof. Harun Nasution (Allahu yarham). 
My class commenced in September 1994 with compulsory two 
courses taught by Professor Harun Nasution, namely (1) 
History of Islamic Civilization and (2) The Thoughts of Kalam 
Theology. The history course refreshed my memory of the 
 
8 The transformation of ‘illah as the method of reinterpreting Islamic 
law (translated.)  
9 Some years later, when I went deeper into legal anthropology field, I 
found out that the practice of Islamic law in Muslim society is 
more of individual instead of collective experience. Thus, maslahat 
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sequence of events in Islamic history since the beginning of 
Islam in Makkah until the collapse of the Ottoman dynasty. 
More importantly, the perspective on the history reading was 
anti-mainstream by bringing some alternative perspectives 
from the classical and modern literature written by Muslim and 
non-Muslim scholars. The Kalam course provided me with the 
various schools of Islamic theology so comprehensively that I 
felt that what I got in my undergraduate study was 
superficial.10 
C. The Correlation between Islamic Law and Theology 
While doing my MA degree (1994-1996), I was still active 
in many FSHI weekly discussions. With some new insights I got 
from my study, I began to propose a new perspective, giving 
new color on Islamic legal thoughts, which used to be theory-
centrist on usul fiqh principles. And now since I was exposed 
with the notion of the influence of theology on Islamic law, 
some big questions emerged: how does theology relate to 
Islamic law? Does theology have a significant impact on law?  
In addition to discussing Fazlur Rahman’s article 
Functional Interdependence of Law and Theology11, translated 
and republished on Jurnal Al-Hikmah in 1992, FSHI happened 
to discuss my paper (a written assignment at the postgraduate 
school) on the intersection between theology and Islamic legal 
theories through the concepts of good (husn) and bad (qubh) of 
human conducts. My paper was trying to answer whether these 
orders were essentialist (coming from within) thus was known 
 
10 I have to admit that these two courses in the postgraduate school 
were equipping me with a strong foundational knowledge, 
particularly when I was assigned as an Assitant Professor at the 
Institute for the Study of Muslim Civilisations in London, United 
Kingdom(2009-2012). I was teaching the ‘Formation of Muslim 
Thought: Theology and Law’ course for master students who are 
coming from various mazhabs and nationalities.  
11 Fazlur Rahman, "Functional Interdependence of law and Theology" 
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by the logic, or these orders could be defined as good or bad 
because the revelation said so. The question turned to the next 
discourse about the status and the function of human logic as 
an instrument to discover and infer the law from sacred texts. 
To what extent the logic could conceive the legal norms and 
have the authority to produce an imperative legal provision? 
Surely, there was no consensus among the scholars of Islamic 
theology and usul fiqh on this particular enquiry.  
Three major groups of ulama (Muslim scholars) responded 
to such question. The first group, Mu`tazilah posits that the 
logic (with its ability given by God) is able to differentiate 
between good and bad. Abu al-Husayn al-Basri, a Mu`tazilah 
ulama mentioned that ‘husn’ or good deed is an act that can be 
done without causing the doer any disapproval. On the other 
hand, ‘qubh’ is opposite to ‘husn’ in a way that when it is done, 
it causes disapproval to the doer. In a nutshell, an act is 
considered as ‘good’ when the logic finds the benefit in it and 
brings no harm or danger.12 In this perspective, Mu`tazilah 
standpoint is quite similar to the Lex Naturalis view.   
The second group is Maturidiah. Slightly different from 
Mu`tazilah, Maturidiah believes that although logic knows the 
good and bad in the essence of an act, the logic does not have 
an authority to instruct human to do the good acts and to 
avoid the bad ones. The one who has such authority, in 
Maturidiah view, is only God, not the logic. Therefore, it is God 
who has the sole authority to instruct an order or to charge a 
prohibition to human. Logic serves merely as the intermediary 
for the demanded or prohibited acts.   
The third group is the Asy`ariah. Compared to Mu`tazilah 
and Maturidiah, Asy`ariah conceives that the human logic does 
not have the ability to judge good or bad values of an act. The 
quality of human act can be solely judged by the revelation. In 
other words, an act is considered as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ depending 
on the order or prohibition from God. An act is judged as ‘good’ 
when revelation said so and when revelation also has appraisal 
for the doer. In contrast, an act is said as ‘bad’ when the 
revelation shows its prohibition and when there is a threat 
sanction for the doer. In sum, the position and the function of 
 
12 Abu al-Husayn Al-Basri, Al-Mu`tamad fi Usul al-Fiqh (Damaskus: al-
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logic in Asy`ariah view is merely an instrument to comprehend 
the messages conveyed by the revelation, thus it is used to dig 
the substantive meaning of the text through the formulation of 
legal methods.13 
Among the three groups mentioned above, Mu`tazilah 
puts logic on a higher position, while Asy`ariah does the 
opposite. Maturidiah position seems in the middle. Mu`tazilah 
sees the logic as moderately parallel to the revelation, thus the 
logic could also be a legislator as could the revelation. In 
contrast, Maturidiah sees the logic mainly as a motivator. That 
is, with the role of logic, humans are motivated to do the good 
acts and avoid the bad ones. For Asy`ariah, however, logic is 
not able to function optimally. Not only is the authority of logic 
be rejected, but also are the logic potentials is neglected by 
Asy`ariah.14 
The big logic absolutely depicts the human independence 
and its strength, while the small logic reflects the human 
weakness. The issue of human strength and weakness seems 
giving implication in the field of Islamic legal thoughts. It is 
questionable whether or not human logic is morally and 
psychologically reliable to make an ijtihad (consensus) on the 
issues that were not textually regulated. The strong logic may 
facilitate the moral bravery to make ijtihad, while the weak one 
may not supportive enough in the reformulation of legal 
thoughts.   
In relation to the function and position of logic at the first 
place, it is important to differentiate between rationalism and 
rationality. Rationalism is a view emphasizing the prominence 
and strength of human logic regardless its incoherence with 
the revelation texts. On the other hand, rationality is closely 
related to ra’y in early Islamic literature which means logic. 
Rationality had been widely known in early Islam indicated by 
the frequent use of ra’y in contriving an ijitihad. Rationality 
 
13  Muhammad Abu Zahrah (n.d.), Usul al-Fiq (Darul al-Fikr al-`Arabi): 
74. 
14 Harun Nasution, Teologi Islam: Aliran-Aliran, Sejarah Analisa 
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had also been a significant phenomenon as there had been 
various methods in legal problem solving between the Ahlul-
Ra`y centered in Iraq (which later established the Hanafi 
school) and the Ahlul-Hadits in Hijaz (which later formed the 
Maliki school). Along with the use of ra’y as a practical 
instrument in exploring and developing the Islamic legal 
thoughts, some concepts and methods emerged such as 
istihsan, qiyas, sad al-dhara`i and istishlah amid legal experts 
in the beginning of Islamic legal institutionalization.  
Rationalism was more recently emerging along with the 
presence of Mu`tazilah which was supported by the Abbasiyah 
dynasty (750-1258 AD) in the early first century of their reign 
in Baghdad. The world at that time had been witnessing the 
growth of rationalism in thinking and debates arose among 
internal and external groups of Islam. Mu`tazilah was the 
pioneer and represented the Islamic rationalism movement 
until it was banned by the khalifa al-Mutawakkil who was 
ruling from 847 to 861 A.D. Ever since, Islamic rationalism was 
gradually decreased though not completely disappeared.  
D. The rational thoughts on Islamic law: Sunni and Shia 
Rationalism as an organized thinking movement did not 
eventually long last, especially because its forerunner as well 
as its supporter (Mu`tazilah) was no longer supported by the 
political leaders at that time. However, the rational theology 
approach in Islamic legal theories remained an interesting 
study for theologians and legal experts. The literature on usul 
fiqh in the following two centuries were utilizing the rationalist 
approach, like the logic and the dialectics. In their books on 
legal theories, some Imam Shafi`i students such as al-Baqillani 
(w. 402/1012), al-Juwaini (w. 478/1085) and al-Ghazali (w. 
505/1111) reformulated theological issues and legal theories 
within the rational approach, such as: taklif (legal liability), 
ta`lil (legal reasoning), maqasid (legal objectives) dan maslahat 
(legal benefits). Two experts in Islamic law from the Mu`tazilah 
group, al-Qadhi Abd al-Jabbar (died in 415/1024) and Abu al-
Husayn al-Basri (died in 435/1044) authored books on usul 
fiqh by incorporating theological discussion. The majority of 
literature on Islamic legal theory in the fifth century of Hijr / 
11st century adopted the theological method, thus the literature 
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some legal scholars and experts view usul fiqh as the branch of 
theology.15 
Not much has been known that the popular work of Imam 
Shafi’i, al-Risalah, was more than a book on usul fiqh. In fact, 
it was precisely a theological response to Mu`tazilah thoughts 
that gave a heavy emphasis in logic over the revelation. 
Although Imam Shafi’i never explicitly mentioned his 
disagreement on Mu`tazilah’s views, his book that was written 
during the Mu`tazilah great influence in Abbasiyah dynasty, 
served as a defensive fortress to resist the widespread of 
rationalism movement in Islam.16 While Mu`tazilah speculates 
that Qur’an is merely God’s creation on earth and that God 
should be fair to all humankind, al-Risalah went beyond this 
view by affirming that Qur’an has all the guidelines for the 
human salvation both in the world and the hereafter. In short, 
al-Risalah sought to re-navigate the theological view from that 
of viewing God’s obligation to the human being to that of 
viewing human obligations to God and to the fellow humans.  
In the words of Makdisi, al-Risalah is the juridical theology, 
that is a study on the God’s orders and prohibitions.17 
By the time the rational legal thinking experienced a 
decline among Sunni after the 11th century, in contrast, some 
legal thinkers of the Shia community, particularly the Usuli 
group, came to the fore. According to Modaressi18, there are 
four sources of Islamic law from the perspective of Usuli: (1) 
Qur’an, (2) Prophet Sunnah and or Imam’s statement, action, 
and approval, (3) Ijma (consensus of Shia fukaha) from which 
 
15  Wael B Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction 
to Sunni Usul al-Fiqh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999): 37-38. 
16 George Makdisi, "The Juridical Theology of Shâfi'î: Origins and 
Significance of Uṣûl al-Fiqh" Studia Islamica 59 (1984): 5-47. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Hossein Modarressi, Introduction to Shi`i Law: A Bibliographical 
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the Imam’s opinions can be traced, (4) human logic. Logic 
serves a very important position in Shia usul fiqh as one of its 
main principle is kullu ma hakama bihi al-`aql, hakama bihi al-
shar` (whatever the reason has instructed, it must have been 
prescribed by the religion). According to a principle known as 
qa`idah al-mulazama (the principle of correlation), a religious 
legal provision could be produced by ijtihad or logical decision. 
This sort of principle reminds us to Mu`tazilah leaders who 
believe that reason could serve as a legislator. Thus, the 
emergence of this rationalist group within Shia community 
might have had something to do with their interaction with the 
Mu`tazilah key figures. 
Another explanation is the fact that some literature by 
Imam Shafi`i students had inspired and influenced the Shia 
thinking on usul fiqh. Stewart pointed out some evidence from 
which the correlation of Shii and Shafi`i scholars took shape: (i) 
some Shii scholars had learned from Shafi`i scholars, (ii) some 
comments and critics on the Shafi`i literature were provided by 
Shii scholars, (iii) some textbooks authored by Shafi`i scholars 
had been used in the Shii education contexts.19 Additionally, 
some concepts and theories of law who were specifically 
attributed to Shafi`i school had also been found in the Shii 
Islamic legal thinking, such as istishab (continuity) and ihtiyat 
(caution). 
The usul fiqh literatures by Sunni scholars (since  3H/9 
A.D) preceded literature by Shia scholars, which written only 
two centuries later (5H/11 A.D). These early literature by Shii 
scholars included: al-Tadzkira bi Usul al-Fiqh by Syekh al-
Mufid (died 413H/1022M); al-Dzari`a ila Usul al-Shari`a by al-
Syarif al-Murtadha (died 436H/1044M); and `Uddat al-Usul fi 
Usul al-Fiqh by Syekh al-Thaifa (died 460H/1067M). These 
three leading Shii scholars were living in the same period as 
the Shafi`i legal theorists (al-Baqillani and al-Juwaini) and 
Mu`tazilah legal experts (Qadi Abd al-Jabbar and Abu Husayn 
al-Basri). This was exactly during the ruling of Buwaihi 
dynasty (934-1055 AD). According to Modaressi, the late 
presence of usul fiqh literature among Shii scholars had a lot 
to do with the Shii communities’ satisfaction of having legal 
 
19 Devin J. Stewart, Islamic legal orthodoxy: Twelver Shiite responses 
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references provided by the twelve living imams. For the first 
four centuries of the Islamic calendar, the need of Islamic legal 
reference and reformulation was fulfilled by these living imams.  
E. The Study of Islam and Politics 
Prior to my master study completion, I diverted my 
research interest. My previous research interest was usul fiqh 
by the consideration that it would deepen my expertise in the 
field. However, I feel that my knowledge on the other research 
interest would be very limited if I keep studying the same topic. 
On the other hand, I would like to explore the Islamic legal 
thoughts from diverse social science disciplines. Then, I 
decided to write my thesis on Islamic politics. This theme was 
inspired by two courses I took in my Graduate School, namely 
Islamic Political Thoughts or Fiqh Siyasa by the late Prof. Dr. 
Munawir Sjadzali (Allahu yarham) and Islam and Politics in 
Indonesia by Prof. Dr. Bahtiar Effendi (Allahu yarham). These 
two professors were then my thesis supervisors under the title 
“Etika Intervensi Negara dalam Pemikiran Politik Ekonomi 
Ibnu Taimiyyah”.20  
Writing a thesis on Islamic politics inspired me with new 
knowledge in explaining how religious norms are enforced in 
the sociopolitical reality. Through the realist-pragmatist 
political lens of Ibn Taimiyya, I comprehend that objective 
reality may redirect the legal thoughts, legal conclusion, or 
legal opinion. (Ibn?) Taimiyya described the political setting 
upon the collapse of Abbasiya and Mamluk dynasties. The 
Levant (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, and now Palestina) were 
severely attacked by Mongol. Taimiyya view sees the concept of 
a nation-state as similar to etatism which believes that nation 
is the main power which controls all political elements in a 
rational tangle controlled strictly by the instrument of power.  
For Ibn Taimiyya, nation-state is everything(?). For him, 
nation and sharia have reciprocal purposes. The nation exists 
for enforcing the sharia, and sharia is present for supporting 
the nation. When the khilafa system collapsed and there were 
no more symbols for Islam unity, Ibn Taimiyya suggested that 
 
20 Arskal Salim, Etika Interventsi Negara: Perspektif Etika Politik Ibnu 
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sharia could be the unifier in supporting the existence of the 
nation. It was then understandable that in the economic 
sector, Ibn Taimiyya allowed the nation to control the 
technicality of business and finance including setting the price 
of goods and services. The concept of nation in Taimiyya 
perspective was very centralistic and crucial.  
My encounter with bibliographical studies on the 
concepts of nation-state in the landscape of Islamic political 
thoughts inspired me to prepare a research proposal in social 
empirical nature. During 1998-1999, when Islamic parties were 
mushrooming everywhere, I sent my proposal to The Asia 
Foundation. The proposal aims at investigating the 
perspectives of Islamic party leaders on the relation between 
religion and nation in Indonesia. The Asia Foundation agreed 
to support this study as an endeavor of education and political 
communication to Indonesian public prior to the General 
Election 1999 where Islamic parties rejoiced after their 
dormancy during the New Order era. This study was then 
summarized into two publications.21 
In September 1999, I obtained a scholarship from CIDA 
for two-semester post graduate sandwich study at McGill 
University, Montreal, Canada. For the nine months of my 
study, I took seven courses in three different departments, 
namely Institute of Islamic Studies, Department of Political 
Science, and Department of Sociology. The series of courses 
widened my theoretical horizon, particularly on the 
sociopolitical approach in explaining Islamic phenomena in 
Indonesia. Some of my assignment papers were published in 
some international conferences which then I revised as book 
chapters and journal articles.22 
 
21 Arskal Salim, Partai Islam dan relasi agama-negara (Jaringan 
Pendidikan Pemilih Untuk Rakyat, 1999); Arskal Salim, “Political 
Islam in Southeast Asia: In Inquiry into the idea of an Islamic 
State in the Post-Soeharto Indonesia” in Seeking Alternative 
Perspectives of Southeast Asia, eds. Andrew TH Tan, Michael LR 
Smith, and Khoo Kay Kim (Malaysia: Perak Academy, 2004). 
22 Arskal Salim, “Zakat Administration in Politics of Indonesian New 
Order” in Shari’a and Politics in Modern Indonesia, ed. Salim and 
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F. The Model of Islamic Legal Approaches in Indonesia 
In early 2002, I got a scholarship from Australian 
government (AUSAID) to pursue my doctoral degree at the 
University of Melbourne for four years. With my previous 
research experiences in writing academic papers at McGill 
University, I constructed my thesis proposal to respond to the 
growing aspiration of Islamic sharia enforcement in Indonesia. 
In my early stage, I had three promoters from University of 
Melbourne, Merle Ricklefs, Abdullah Saeed and Tim Lindsey. In 
the later stages, I had only Professor Lindsey acting as my 
main supervisor as Professor Saeed was overload by the 
doctoral supervisees and Professor Ricklefs moved out to NUS 
Singapore. Fortunately, these two professors had tremendously 
contributed during my proposal writing until my first two 
years, particularly on the approach of my study.  
My main argument in my doctoral thesis departed from 
the theory of Islamization in Indonesia by Ricklefs in some of 
his works. The history of Islamization in Indonesia did not only 
transform the people religion and belief, but also transform the 
culture system in so many aspects. Upon the Indonesian 
independence, this Islamization penetrated into the multiple 
layers of political structure though did not always succeed. By 
adopting and modifying this theory, my thesis was trying to 
explain that the aspiration of Islamic sharia enforcement in 
Indonesia is a part of the Islamization which occurred since the 
13th century. In particular, for my thesis specialization, the 
Islamization happened in the legal field; therefore, the aspect of 
formal law in the Indonesian administration system was a 
contestation area between the pros and the cons.  
To point out how the process of Islamic legalization 
occurred in the Indonesian setting in the period of 1945-2005, 
I proposed three cases. The first case was the amendment of 
Article 29 Law 1945 on religion. The second case was the 
 
Arskal Salim, “Discourses on Democracy within Debates on Islam-
State Relations in Indonesia”, Journal of Indonesian Islam 2 (1) 
(2008); Arskal Salim, “Between ICMI and NU: The Contested 
Representation of Muslim Civil Society in Indonesia, 1990-2001” 
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legislation of zakat management. The third case was the 
autonomy of Islamic sharia provision in Aceh. For these three 
cases, I employed these approaches (either discrete or 
combined): (1) historical approach, (2) constitutional law 
approach, (3) comparative politics approach. These three 
approaches were the models that I learned from my supervisors 
and colored my data analysis process from both the literature 
and interviews with the informants. 
 
1. Historical Approach 
By the historical approach, my dissertation discussion 
did not only focused on the post-independence era, but also 
focused on several decades or centuries ahead. For example, 
a discussion on the amendment of Article 29 Constitution 
1945 on religious matter tracked back the roots of debates 
between religion and nation in 1920-1930s, between 
Soekarno and his political opponents from Islamic parties. 
The second example on the discussion of zakat management 
legislation, it traced back the historical facts on the zakat 
collection in Java in the second half of 19th century when 
Snouck Hurgronje was assigned as the advisor for Islamic 
politics of Dutch East Indies.  Lastly, the discussion on the 
enforcement of sharia law in Aceh, it traced back the history 
of the 17th century where Aceh sultanate was in its victory 
and claimed the Islamic sharia enforcement. All of these 
historical approaches generated an analysis that these three 
study cases were connected long strings of the intricate 
relationship between Islam (and the interpretation of its 
teachings) and the nation (with the state administration).  
2. Constitutional Law Approach 
The Constitutional Law Approach, the thesis presented 
controversies and antagonism among norms, logics, and 
legal arguments which are contesting to support claims and 
needs of pros and cons groups. The discussion on Article 29 
Constitution 1945 pointed out inconsistent logics and legal 
arguments from Representatives fractions. The article was 
claimed as containing reformist and democratic values.  
Another discussion on zakat legislation raised a 
fundamental question, “Why does Indonesia as a nation-
state give tax privilege to Muslim zakat payers while the 
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Lastly, the discussion on the Islamic sharia enforcement in 
Aceh brought complex constitutional issues on how a 
province with Muslim majority was justified to enforce 
Islamic sharia to its people while the other provinces with 
the same Muslim majority do not have the same privilege.   
 
3. Comparative Political Approach 
By employing a Comparative Political approach, the 
thesis discussed some similar concepts or cases which 
occurred in another country as a benchmark to analyze 
three case studies in the thesis. The discussion on the 
amendment of the 1945 Constitution on Article 29 was 
correlated to the concept and practice of millet under the 
Ottoman governance. Millet was used as the analytical 
comparison framework to explore how Islamic parties in 
Indonesia amended  Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution in 
order to practice millet in contemporary Indonesia. Another 
discussion looked into the legislation of zakat regulations 
which referred to Pakistan experience under the ruling of 
President Ziaul Haq who enforced a centralistic Zakat 
Ordinance. By a comparative diagnosis, the process of zakat 
legislation in Indonesia can be predicted to produce a similar 
result as Pakistan. Later, the other discussion analyzed the 
Islamic sharia in Aceh which assumedly adapts Iran’s 
pattern and experience on their wilayatul faqih where the 
ulama lead the government. Acehnese religious scholars 
held a prominent role in cultural and scriptural settings, 
especially during the sultanate era and independence period. 
However, upon the decline of the New Order regime and 
unsupportive political situation, these scholars were not able 
to manage and control the political administration as what 
happened in Iran.  
In 2006, I finished my doctoral study in the University 
of Melbourne. Two years later, my thesis was published by 
Hawaii University Press entitled Challenging the Secular 
State: The Islamization of Laws in Modern Indonesia.23 This 
 
23 Arskal Salim, Challenging the secular state: The Islamization of law 
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book was reviewed by five scholars and experts across the 
globe and the reviews were published in reputable 
international journals.24 In general, the reviewers express 
their appreciation, appraisal, and positive comment for the 
book that I authored. I would like to quote some of their 
positive comments below:  
 
∙ [this book is] “a very important contribution to the 
literature on Islam and Muslim politics in general and on 
Indonesia in particular”  
∙ “it is a testimony to Salim’s intellectual versatility 
that he brings these ethical divisions into focus, while 
also providing an even-handed overview of sharia 
debates”. 
 
G. Legal Anthropology 
Upon the completion of my doctoral study, I returned to 
Indonesia in March 2006 to teach at UIN Jakarta. While 
teaching, I assisted a foreign NGO in a recovery program post 
Tsunami in Aceh. This NGO focused on legal issues emerged as 
the result of Tsunami 2004. For six months, I had been living 
in Aceh and I learned about Aceh common law. From my 
learning on Aceh common law and legal issues of post-
Tsunami, I wrote a monograph in Bahasa Indonesia discussing 
the practice of legal issue arrangements related to the lands, 
inheritance, and guardianship in Banda Aceh and Aceh Besar.   
My involvement in some legal cases in post-tsunami Aceh 
motivated me to conduct a more intensive study. 
Coincidentally, there was an opportunity of postdoctoral fellow 
in a Germany leading research institute, Max Planck Institute 
for Social Anthropology located in Halle, ex East Germany 
region. I applied for this position with a research proposal on 
Legal Issues among the postTsunami society. Having 
interviewed in Jakarta, I succeed in this fellowship and I went 
off to Germany to begin my fellowship on November 1st, 2006.   
 
 
24 Among others are Journal of American Academy of Religion 77 
(2009), Indonesia 88 (2009), Pacific Affairs 82 (2009), Studia 
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In my first six months in Germany, under the mentorship 
of Prof. Dr. Franz von Benda-Beckmann and his wife Prof. Dr. 
Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, I recognized the significant 
difference of approach in understanding and explaining a legal 
fact. These two mentors were willing to introduce another 
anthropological approach which is new for me in the field of 
Islamic law. By this approach, the Islamic law study is 
navigated to the direction of seeking the causes of disputes, the 
process of settlement, the difference of legal reasoning as the 
basis of both claims, the results of the settlement and the 
logical arguments offered by the intermediary or judge in his 
verdict.  
What about legal pluralism? Both Benda-Beckmanns 
agree that legal pluralism is one of analytical methods in the 
field of legal anthropology. It means that legal pluralism is not 
a discrete approach. Legal pluralism is defined as the existence 
of two or more legal norms or legal systems interacting one 
another in a process of legal modernization of a state country.25 
In Woodman’s view, legal pluralism in a modern state is a 
specific method of legal arrangement for diverse population 
(races, ethnicities, and religions) to obtain his/her particular 
treatment or legal autonomy.26    
Having the dispute and legal pluralism as the units of 
analysis, the legal anthropology was employed to explain and 
understand the social reality and personal experience in 
responding the legal cases. In this purpose, two qualitative 
methods (ethnography and case study) became so crucial in 
the legal anthropology approach. During my stay for 10 months 
in Lhoknga, Banda Aceh, I conducted an ethnography and case 
study for various legal cases which occurred in the village and  
the regency. I also looked into the disputes proceed by the 
Mahkamah Syar’iyah and state(civil?) courts in Banda Aceh 
and Jantho (the capital of Aceh Besar regency). 
 
25 Michael Barry Hooker, Legal pluralism: An introduction to colonial 
and neo-colonial laws (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975) 
26 Gordon R. Woodman, "The idea of legal pluralism." Legal pluralism 
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During my ethnography study of Aceh law, I conducted 
interview and observation for twofold purposes: (1) to describe 
deeply and holistically the Acehnese social law culture, 
particularly on the premise that there is a strong connection 
between Shafii mazhab and the local legal practice, (2) to 
explore the views and experiences of Acehnese people (local 
knowledge) in practicing the law and in responding legal cases. 
In this case, ethnography underlines the importance of native’s 
point of view so-called emic. Emic is clearly different from etic 
which refers to the researcher’s view and analysis.  
Due to the significance of emic in ethnography, I managed 
to make time every morning or afternoon to make daily field 
notes. These notes narrated the interview results containing 
the name of the informants, location, date and time, keywords 
from the interview, analytical points, and reflective questions. 
Although most of interviews were digitally recorded, the field 
notes were more reliable when I need to quickly acquire some 
information. To date, I am still keeping all of my field notes. In 
addition to being as archives, these notes are often inspiring 
me to write papers for conferences or publication.  
I have to admit that my background and my foundational 
discipline is the theory of Islamic law. This is the scholarship 
and expertise that I began since my study at the Department of 
Comparative Law and Islamic Schools of IAIN Ciputat in early 
90-s. My second expertise on legal politics and legal 
anthropology was as a result of my intensive and extensive 
interaction with the literatures, communication with the 
reviewers, mentoring with other professors, and interaction 
with the other experts in these fields.  
In the theories and methods in legal anthropology, I have 
learned greatly from Professor John Bowen, Washington 
University at St. Louis, United States of America. My 
connection was initiated by a book review27 that I wrote for his 
book Islam, Law and Equality in Indonesia.28 I deliberately 
 
27 Arskal Salim, "Islamic Law and the Issue of Gender Equality in 
Indonesia.” Australian Journal of Asian Law 7, no. 2 (2005): 187. 
28 John Richard Bowen, Islam, law, and equality in Indonesia: An 
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quote here the Introduction and the Conclusion parts in that 
Review to point out how Islamic law is studied with a 
technically different method. In the Introduction section I 
wrote:  
 
“[John] Bowen, a scholar from America, has sought 
to provide a new perspective, namely that of 
anthropology, in investigating Islamic law.  For this 
anthropologist, who conducted participatory research for 
several years in the Gayo highlands of Aceh, the 
implementation of Islamic law is not exclusively 
understood as a transcendence of ritual, but is viewed 
more as a cultural phenomenon where individuals and 
society are involved in the process of its formation.  
Islamic Law, as such, consists not only of divine 
inspiration originating from God, but is also a product of 
the aforementioned interaction.”   
 
Later on, on the Conclusion section I asserted: 
 
“What Bowen has done via this work constitutes an 
analysis of Islamic law as a socio-cultural phenomenon 
and not merely as a legal or political fact.  In the context 
of academic developments in Indonesia this book is 
clearly a relatively novel and very valuable contribution. 
For until now empirical studies which have sought to take 
up a case involving the implementation of Islamic law 
have been looking more from the point of view of 
accordance with Islamic legal precepts as a parameter.  
In other words, the academic research we often encounter 
in Islamic tertiary institutions in Indonesia, in mini-theses, 
theses and dissertations, invariably posit Islamic legal 
doctrines as the standard of truth to be used to 
interrogate whether a case of the application of an Islamic 
law within society is in accordance with, or conversely in 
fact contrary to Islamic legal regulations.  This book of 
Bowen’s teaches us a lesson that Islamic law is not 
exclusively to be found in Holy Scriptures, but also 
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and vertical in nature; in village meetings, court rooms, 
parliamentary sessions and bureaucratic decisions”. 
 
My research experience with John Bowen during 
Andromaque project (France) for three years (2011-2013) gave 
me more opportunity to study further on the legal theories and 
anthropology methods. Our research focused on the property 
rights of women in Aceh and South Sulawesi. The property 
rights include the dowry, joint property, heredity, and post-
divorce settlement. In Aceh and South Sulawesi, we paid some 
visits and made some observation of trials in religious courts. 
We also interviewed some parties such as the judges, lawyers, 
the plaintiffs (women), heads of village, and some academia in 
Syiah Kuala University and Hasanudin University. I obtained 
some specific lessons from John Bowen in this research, 
especially in applying the framework of plural legal reasoning 
within the dispute of women property rights. Parts of this study 
added with some chapters authored by research assistants and 
other Indonesian scholars has been published by Brill in 
2018.29  
H. The Pluralism of Islamic Law 
On the Islamic landscape, it is a common phenomenon of 
pluralism of thoughts or legal practices. The earliest pluralism 
can be found in the era of Prophet Muhammad PBUH. It was 
narrated in Sahih Bukhari that the Prophet instructed a 
Muslim squad to fight the Bani Qurayza. In that instruction, 
Prophet emphasized that they should perform Asar prayer in 
the Qurayza village. A part of the squad interpreted this 
command literally, thus they performed Asar prayer once they 
arrived at the village though the prayer time was overdue. 
Another part of the squad depicted the message differently. The 
squad should travel so quickly thus they can still perform Asar 
prayer in the middle of their journey. When Prophet 
acknowledged this difference, he did not make any correction 
on both interpretations. This sample indicates that the 
practices of Islamic law in Muslim society have never been 
monolithic. The historical facts showed that for the first three 
centuries of Islam presence (6th century), the practices and 
 
29 John Bowen and Arskal Salim (eds), Women and Property Rights in 
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thoughts of Islamic law were so plural as indicated by the 
emergence of Islamic legal mazhabs from Sunni (Hanafi, Maliki, 
Shafii dan Hanbali) and non-Sunni (Ja’fari and Zaydi).   
I feel so lucky to begin my intellectual career as a student 
of the Department of Comparative Law and Islamic Schools 
where I learned the dynamics of early Islamic law. For more 
than ten years, I have been exploring the anthropology of 
Islamic legal thoughts by employing legal pluralism as an 
analytical tool. I frequently found this method and approach in 
my social experience and I can peruse it for my personal 
religious practice.   
I recalled when I was living in London in 2010 and 
performed fasting during the Ramadhan. I woke up and had 
my sahoor at 2.30 in the morning and I had my iftar at 8 in the 
evening, thus I was fasting for more than 17 hours per day. 
Thankfully, the time of sahoor and iftar moved slowly each day, 
the sahoor ended later and the iftar came earlier for 2 or 3 
minutes. For example, in early Ramadhan 2010 the imsak was 
at 3.19; by the end of Ramadhan 2010, the imsak was at 4.27. 
Iftar time in early Ramadhan 2010 was at 20.33 while at the 
end of Ramadhan it was at 19.31.   
I found some interesting facts on the fasting hours in 
London at that time. From the flyers that I got from the mosque 
near my flat, there were two versions of imsak time namely 
Central Mosque London and Hizbul Ulama UK. The imsak time 
that I mentioned earlier was by Central Mosque London. The 
Hizbul Ulama, on the other hand, set the imsak time 30 
minutes later than the Central Mosque. Let say if the Central 
Mosque imsak time was 3.19, the Hizbul Ulama time was 3.49. 
One day, as I had some work at the office, I had my sahoor 
earlier that night and I intended to skip sahoor in the morning. 
The next morning, my wife and my son were getting up late, 
five minutes over the imsak time by Central Mosque version. 
Having in mind that there was another version of imsak time, 
they decided to follow the second version by Hizbul Ulama 
which allowed them to have more time to have their sahoor. As 
I enquired some of my colleagues in London, they also 
preferred the imsak time by the Hizbul Ulama for it gave them 
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This kind of flexible schedule could also apply for the iftar 
time, particularly when Ramadhan came in summer whose day 
time is longer than the night. The fiqh literature mentioned 
that there are at least four different opinions for the iftar time 
in the countries where the days are longer than the nights. The 
first opinion states that the iftar is signaled by the sunset, thus 
if the sun sets at 10 p.m., the iftar is at 10 p.m. The second 
opinion mentions that the iftar time is set by the most 
proximate Muslim country. In the European setting, for 
instance, the closest Muslim country is Morocco and Turkey. 
The third opinion asserts that Ramadhan time (including the 
imsak and iftar time) is inferred from the countries of origin of 
Islamic sharia (Mecca and Madinah). The last opinion says that 
the fasting time is defined by the person’s country of origin.  
Of those four opinions, I personally prefer the first one, 
that iftar is defined by the sunset. It does not necessarily mean 
that I imply the first opinion is the most correct of all, yet I feel 
that the first option gives me a spiritual comfort. It does not 
feel correct for me to have my iftar while the Asar time is going 
on. You can imagine if you have your iftar then you perform 
Asar prayer instead of Maghrib prayer. However, I was not 
always consistent with that first choice. There were one or two 
occurrences during my stay in Europe that I had iftar at 6.00 
p.m. when the sun was not completely setting. For example, 
when I was invited as a guest in my colleague’s house when I 
follow the host’s believed opinion that the iftar was at 6 p.m. In 
that case, I negotiated my personal option for respecting the 
host.  
It has been long time that I acquired some axiomatic 
explanation from Islamic law textbooks related to the number 
and time in the Quran. The maxim mentions that any number 
and time in the Quran are absolute and nonnegotiable. 
However, as I lived and experienced the different settings, I 
would predict that such maxim may no longer valid. My first 
encounter with this maxim was in my undergraduate year in 
Ciputat. I was reading an article by the late Professor Ibrahim 
Hosen (Allah yarham). He pointed out in this article that the 
Quran told a story about Ayub who promised to hit his wife for 
100 times (with a single lid) but eventually he hit only once 
(with 100 lids bundled as one). This story indicates that despite 
the explicitly commanded number, the practice can be applied 
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that one hit may mean a hundred hits. My thought was more 
provoked by David Powers30 analysis on the Islamic heredity 
law in Arabic society. The law says that the widow of a dead 
husband gets 1/8 or 1/9. For Powers, though the Quran 
mentions 1/8 explicitly, in the legal heredity practice which 
could imply the `awl or rad (rounding up or down), the amount 
may change.  
There were definitely some socio-historical justifications of 
how legal changes occurred. One of the strongest reasoning 
stated that the change occurred in the early period of Islam 
and the early generation of the Companions and tabi’in. The 
legal change was considered as legitimate since it was guided 
by the revelation and strong eschatological and spiritual 
nuance. However, this justification did not provide a 
satisfactory answer. Even more, another question arose and I 
kept looking for the valid explanation.   
One of the most compelling questions was: Is every legal 
opinion (ijtihad) contains truth (hal kullu al-mujtahid musib)? 
There is a hadith saying that a valid ijtihad will earn two 
advantages while an invalid ijtihad will earn one advantage. 
When brought to the legal setting, this question can be 
formulated as: in every legal problem, does God only require 
one single rule to apply (hukm mu`ayyan)? Further, the 
question continues, “If Islamic law is rooted from the God 
conduct who is The Most Authoritative, why there are so many 
legal opinions in the same space and time which claim as 
having the equal legitimacy? If all opinions are equally 
legitimate, does not God have a specific legal command? In 
short, is there only one valid legal opinion; or are there plural 
valid legal opinions?  
Questions after questions continued: “If God does not 
have a specific command, who verifies the legal compliance as 
what developed by the Islamic scholars?”, “If God has multiple 
legal commands but the humans cannot retrieve that due to 
their limitation, can sharia contribute meaning to the 
humanity?”, “In contrast, if God has a command and the 
 
30 David S Powers, "Islamic Inheritance System: A Socio-Historical 




             M. Arskal Salim GP, From Usul Fiqh to Legal Pluralism… | 103 
 
humans retrieve it, how can we differentiate whether the legal 
opinion belongs to God or manmade?  
 
Quite often, as an escape from this conundrum, I tend to 
revisit the concept of God’s Oneness. God is The Most Singular, 
and the other creatures are plural. With this perspective, I 
imagine that the singular God despite His ability and 
command, He does not create one single kind of creatures, one 
single entity of life, one legal structure, or one single social 
system. Aside from his Oneness, any other creation is plural, 
thus the diversity is given.   
I. Conclusion 
To conclude this article, I would like to make a final note 
on the use of autoethnography method in my personal 
narrative all above. There are two emerging questions here. 
First of all, how can personal stories be considered as 
scientific? In this case, Carolyn Ellis mentions that there are 
three questions for which can be answered affirmatively prove 
the value of personal narrative. Those questions are (1) Can the 
author legitimately make these claims for his story? (2) Did the 
author learn anything new about himself? (3) Will this story 
help others cope with or better understand their worlds?31 For 
these three questions, I am confident answering with 
affirmation that my narratives fulfill those questions.  
My second question quoted Sarah Wall’s (as mentioned in 
the Introduction section): Is personal experience which is 
beneficial for a wider context can be seen as a research result? 
As a legal ethnographer, I completely agree with her who 
believes that knowledge is not necessarily produced by 
research work, given that personal narratives can contribute 
knowledge to what we know about the world in which we live.32  
Through this autoethnographic paper, I involved myself 
intensely in a process of academic culture (research and 
 
31 Carolyn Ellis, “Creating Criteria: An Ethnographic Short Story”, 
Qualitative Inquiry 6 (2) 2000, pp. 273-277.  
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publication on Islamic law topics) which is complex in terms of 
struggle of thoughts. My stories went across time, themes, 
theories, scientific forums, which might not always be linear. 
All of these efforts are in the spirit of presenting this 
autoethnographic piece which both personal and intellectual, 
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